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THE RIGHT TO SUBPOENA EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THE
FEES REQUIRED TO BE PAID THEREFOR
By PAUL L. PORTERFIELD
Member of the California Bar
The problems involved in attempting to subpoena expert testimony lead
us first to a consideration of what types of questions may be put to an expert.
Then, there is the additional factor of privilege. The answers to the questions
may be some form of privileged communication protected against revelation
in court. The California cases have to some extent pursued both lines of
inquiry.
In approaching the question of subpoenaing an expert witness, several
variable factors must be borne in mind as to what type of testimony is
desired. If it is ordinary observation testimony, it is axiomatic that it can
be required from an expert just as it can be required from an ordinary witness
in reasonably full possession of his faculties. If it is what might be called
expert observation testimony, we have a slightly more complex situation.
For example, if a physician has examined a patient and had an X-ray taken,
the question of whether the patient has an aneurism is a question of observed
fact even though it requires expert training to observe the fact, or possibly
even to know what it is. Expert observations can also be reached by subpoena
or on cross examination. It is in regard to expert opinion testimony that the
greatest dearth of authority and the greatest amount of actual and potential
uncertainty exists.
Expert opinion is the conclusion of someone trained in a particular field
from facts observed by or presented to him. The expert training is needed
both to understand the facts and to form the opinion. The prognosis of a
physician, the opinion of a handwriting expert as to the identical authorship
of two specimens, the property valuation of a real estate appraiser are, in
their respective fields, examples of expert opinion.
A second line of inquiry that cuts across these questions is the question
of the willingness or unwillingness of the expert to testify and which type
of witness fee, ordinary or expert, he must be paid. He might be willing
to give expert opinion evidence for the fee of an ordinary witness. He might
be willing to do so only for an expert witness fee or he might be absolutely
unwilling whatever fee was tendered him.
A third group of questions revolves about whether the expert is asked
to give an impromptu opinion on the witness stand, possibly from data, real
or hypothetical, just then submitted to him or is asked whether he has previ-
ously reached an opinion, which opinion the party subpoenaing him is trying
to put in evidence. The opinion may or may not have been reduced to writing
in the form of a report.
(50)
RIGHT TO SUBPOENA EXPERT TESTIMONY 51
It is uniformly held in California that in addition to the statutory duty
in Code of Civil Procedure section 20651 to answer legal and pertinent
questions put to him, an expert may be asked specific facts that he has
observed notwithstanding they involve expert testimony and that he discovered
them by reason of this special training. Moreover, he need only be paid
ordinary witness fees therefor.'
However, it is also held in California that an expert witness cannot be
compelled to undertake an expert investigation for the purpose of qualifying
himself to testify. It has been said that a party cannot impose this duty upon
an unwilling witness. In People v. Barnes3 a handwriting expert was asked
for an impromptu opinion on the stand as to the possibly identical authorship
of several specimens of handwriting, some of which he had never seen before.
It was held he did not have to express an opinion. In People v. Conte4 a
physician was asked whether the stains on a piece of rock were blood. The
doctor refused to testify without expert witness fees. It was held that since
this could not be determined without a microscopic examination he did not
have to undertake one.
The Conte case mentions the possible expense to the expert of this exam-
ination. The Barnes case simply says this duty cannot be imposed on an
unwilling witness. A situation where expert witness fees were tendered and
then the expert was asked and refused to undertake the examination has not
arisen yet. In the Conte case the subpoenaing party moved that expert witness
fees be awarded out of the county treasury. This was denied by the court.
On the question of witness fees there seems to be no general California
statute providing for expert witness fees except Code of Civil Procedure,
section 187. 5 There are special situations in which statutory compensation
*§ 2065 (Deering 1953) : "A witness must answer questions legal and pertinent to the matter
in issue, though his answer may establish a claim against himself; but he need not give an answer
which will have a tendency to subject him to punishment for a felony; nor need he give an answer
which will have a direct tendency to degrade his character, unless it be to the very fact in issue,
or to a fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness must answer as to the
fact of his previous conviction for felony unless he has previously received a full and unconditional
pardon, based upon a certificate of rehabilitation."2City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco,
37 Cal.2d 227, 231 P.2d 26, 25 A.L.R.2d 1418 (1951) ; McClenahan v. Keyes, 188 Cal. 574, 206 Pac.
454 (1922) ; People v. Joseph Barnes, 111 CaLApp. 605, 295 Pae. 1045 (1931) ; People v. Conte,
17 CaLApp. 771, 122 Pac. 450 (1912).
'111 Cal.App. 605, 295 Pac. 1045 (1931).
'17 Cal.App. 771, 122 Pac. 450 (1912).
§ 1871 (Deering 1953) : "Whenever it shall be made to appear to any court or judge thereof,
either before or during the trial of any action or proceeding, civil, criminal, or juvenile court,
pending before such court, that expert evidence is, or -will be required by the court or any party
to such action or proceeding, such court or judge may, on motion of any party, or on motion of
such court or judge, appoint one or more experts to investigate and testify at the trial of such action
or proceeding relative to the matter or matters as to which such expert evidence is, or will be
required, and such court or judge may fix the compensation of such expert or experts for such
services, if any, as such expert or experts may have rendered, in addition to his or their services
as a witness or witnesses, at such amount or amounts as to the court or judge may seem reasonable.
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of experts is provided. Metropolitan Water District v. Adams' was a condem-
nation by the water district. There was a partial abandonment by the plain-
tiff. The defense submitted a high cost bill for geodetic experts both for
pretrial preparation and for testimony at the trial. The trial court disallowed
both. The Supreme Court pointed out that Code of Civil Procedure section
1255a7 governs the expenses of pretrial preparation in a condemnation aban-
donment. It is up to the trial court to determine "necessary expenses" and
"reasonable attorney's fees" as provided by Code of Civil Procedure,
section 1255a. The judgment was reversed and remanded to the trial
court for a determination on these items. But as to the testimony at the trial,
Code of Civil Procedure section 1871 governs. This code section authorizes
the court to fix the compensation of court-appointed experts within reasonable
limits. Expert witnesses produced by the parties to the action receive only
the ordinary witness fee as expressly provided in Code of Civil Procedure
section 1871.
Proceeding one step further, in the situation where the expert opinion has
already been rendered and the subpoenaing party wishes to put the opinion
in evidence, we have no California case on this point save those dealing with
the privilege question. The Barnes case states:
". .. where a doctor has made a medical examination of a party and
has formed an opinion as to the physical injuries suffered he may be required
to testify as to the opinion which he has formed, based upon the facts dis-
closed by such examination. .... 
It is to be noted that this proposition is not necessary to the decision
in the Barnes case, the actual holding in the case being merely that a party
cannot impose upon an unwilling expert witness the duty to make a scientific
investigation for the purpose of forming and giving an expert opinion. For
the broader proposition quoted above, the court relied on a Washington case,
State ex rel. Berge v. Superior Court of King County,9 wherein the court
actually did approve the subpoenaing of an expert opinion. It involved a
personal injury suit wherein the defendant hired a physician who, with the
'23 Cal.2d 770, 147 P.2d 6 (1944).
'§ 1255a (Deering 1953) : "Plaintiff may abandon the proceedings at any time after filing the
complaint and before the expiration of thirty days after final judgment, by serving on defendants
and filing in court a written notice of such abandonment; and failure to comply with such section
1251 of this code shall constitute an implied abandonment of the proceeding. Upon such abandon-
ment express or implied, on motion of any party, a judgment shall be entered dismissing the pro-
ceeding and awarding the defendants their costs and disbursements, which shall include all necessary
expenses incurred in preparing for trial and reasonable attorney fees. These costs and disburse-
ments, including expenses and attorney fees, may be claimed in and by a cost bill, to be prepared,
served, filed and taxed as in civil actions; provided, however, that upon judgment of dismissal on
motion of plaintiff, defendants, and each of them, may file a cost bill within thirty (30) days after
notice of entry of such judgment; that said costs and disbursements shall not include expenses
incurred in preparing for trial where the said action is dismissed forty days prior to the time set
for the trial of the said action."8111 CaLApp. 605, 610, 295 Pac. 1045, 1047 (1931).
"154 Wash. 144, 281 Pac. 335 (1929).
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plaintiff's consent, examined her. Later, the plaintiff took the physician's
deposition. At the trial, the latter testified, without objection, to the facts he
had observed during his examination of the plaintiff. He was then asked on
cross examination his opinion of the nature and extent of the plaintiff's
injuries. He refused to answer. It was held he could be made to answer and
was not entitled to more than ordinary compensation unless special services,
other than attendance at the trial, were required. It is to be noted; first, that
this was a five to four decision in the Washington Supreme Court; second,
that the court said that the plaintiff who voluntarily submitted to examination
by a physician employed by defendant could thereafter interrogate him as to
his medical opinion without compensation other than ordinary witness fee.
Then the court added an interesting qualification:
"This is not a case where the adverse party seeks to call a witness
employed by the other party and interrogate him as to matters which require
special preparation without the party calling him having in any matter
cooperated."'10
What the holding would be if the calling party had not cooperated, as in
this case, by submitting to a medical examination by the expert witness, is
hard to predict. Undoubtedly, as the court's dictum states and the California
cases hold, the calling party cannot make the witness undertake an expert
examination in order to answer the calling party's questions. But suppose
the examination has already been made for the party who originally hired
the witness and the calling party wishes to elicit the expert opinion which was
formed as a result of this examination?
A fairly recent New York case, in 1947, takes a position squarely contra
to the dictum in the Barnes case and the actual holding in the Washington
case. The case, People v. Thorpe, ex rel. Kraushur Bros. & Co.," involved
a tax certiorari proceeding. A real estate appraiser had prepared an appraisal
of the property in question for a previous owner. The expert was subpoenaed
by the relator, who sought to elicit his opinion as to the value of the property.
The witness declined to accept a fee and testify. It does not appear from the
report of the case whether the fee was an ordinary one or an expert fee.
In any case the witness' refusal to testify does not appear to have been on
financial grounds as in some of the California cases. He stated that he did
not wish to take part in the case.
The New York Court of Appeals held that while he could be required
to testify like an ordinary witness as to what he had seen on the premises,
he could not be compelled against his will to answer any questions connected
with his experience and judgment as a real estate expert nor to give his
opinion as an expert. The court found two lines of cases in the United States.
'Id. at 147-148, 281 Pac. 335 at 336.21296 N.Y. 223, 72 N.E.2d 165 (1947).
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1. Those states holding that a court could not compel expert testimony
at all;
2. Those states where a court could compel expert opinions but even
those states, the New York court observed, limit the opinions to those experts
are able to give without a study of the the facts or other preparation.
California is listed as being in the second group, although no careful
study is made of the California holdings. The Conte case in California and
the Berge case in Washington are cited under group 2. The New York court
goes on to say that the latter rule is quite unsatisfactory, that only the most
eminent are competent to answer extempore and defend impromptu opinions
on cross examination, but that no expert may without reflection on his profes-
sional ability confess ignorance; and that the better rule is not to compel
a witness to give his expert opinion against his will.
The court of appeals' discussion of the unsatisfactory nature of im-
promptu opinions would have considerable bearing on the asking of hypo-
thetical questions on cross examination. A hypothetical question might state
a situation so intricate that only the most eminent could give an extempore
opinion based on such a situation, or it might omit certain factors that any
expert in that field has to know to render an opinion at all.
But the New York court apparently overlooked the fact that what was
asked for in this case was not an impromptu opinion that could be rendered
without study but a repetition of an opinion previously reached, presumably
after full study. If conditions have changed so as to outdate the former
opinion, the expert has only to say so on the witness stand.
After examining these cases from three states, it could be predicted that,
in the absence of other considerations, the California courts would probably
allow expert opinion testimony to be reached on subpoena or cross-examina-
tion if the opinion had been previously reached, as in an appraisal report
already made. Probably only ordinary witness fees need be paid. The Cali-
fornia cases point this way, and while the Washington case cited by our
District Court of Appeals in the Barnes case does qualify its language by
dictum, the qualification does seem to relate to a situation where the questions
asked the expert witness require special preparation not already made. The
fact of the expert witness called having previously cooperated with the calling
party would probably not be regarded by the California courts as controlling
in view of the California cases. The New York court's reasoning in its own
case does not seem to apply to the very situation presented in the case.
The most important of the other considerations mentioned in the last
paragraph is the question of privilege, particularly the attorney-client privi-
lege. The attempt to place the expert's opinion in evidence may collide full
tilt with some policy of the law against later revelation of a communication
without the consent of the party for whose benefit the privilege exists. In Webb
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v. Francis J. Lewald Coal Co., 2 plaintiff was 'uing the City and County of
San Francisco and the Lewald Coal Co. for damages due to shock when the
City's street car and the company's coal truck collided in such a manner
as to cause the truck to crash into the front of plaintiff's millinery store.
Plaintiff, in order to aid her counsel in the preparation of her case, submitted
to a physical examination by Dr. Joseph Catton, a neurologist. He reduced
his conclusions to writing and delivered them to plaintiff's counsel, retaining
a copy. Dr. Catton was not called at the trial but another physician testified.
On cross-examination it was elicited from plaintiff that Dr. Catton examined
her. Defendants thereupon subpoenaed him and asked him to produce his
written report, which he refused to do. It appeared that Dr. Catton had never
prescribed for or treated the plaintiff.
The trial court excused the witness on his own objection that he was
entitled to satisfactory compensation. It appeared also that the witness
alleged ethical objections. The trial court stated that it was up to the defend-
ants to overcome his ethical scruples. But the witness was never returned to
the stand. Defendants asserted serious prejudicial error.
On appeal, the Supreme Court, after discussing the physician-patient
privilege,"8 and the patient-litigant exception thereto, 4 concluded that the
testimony sought was covered by the privilege and then added that even if
the testimony sought was not covered by the physician-patient privilege it was
covered by the attorney-client privilege, 5 quoting approvingly "communica-
12214 Cal. 182, 4 P.2d 532, 77 A.L.R. 675 (1931).
"Calif. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1881(4) (Deering 1953) : "A licensed physician or surgeon can
not, without the consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action, as to any information acquired
in attending the patient, which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient;
provided, however, that either before or after probate, upon the contest of any will executed, or
claimed to have been executed, by such patient, or after the death of such patient, in any action
involving the validity of any instrument executed, or claimed to have been executed by such patient,
or after the death of such patient, in any action involving the validity of any instrument executed,
or claimed to have been executed, by him, conveying or transferring any real or personal property,
such physician or surgeon may testify to the mental condition of said patient and in so testifying
may disclose information acquired by him concerning said deceased which was necessary to enable
him to prescribe or act for such deceased; provided further, that after the death of the patient, the
executor of his will, or the administrator of this estate, or the surviving spouse of the deceased,
or if there be no surviving spouse, the children of the deceased personally, or, if minors, by their
guardian, may give such consent, in any action or proceeding brought to recover damages on
account of the death of the patient; provided further, that where any person brings an action to
recover damages for personal injuries, such action shall be deemed to constitute a consent by the
person bringing such action that any physician who has prescribed for or treated said person and
whose testimony is material in said action shall testify; and provided further, that the bringing
of an action, to recover for the death of a patient, by the executor of his will, or by the adminis-
trator of his estate, or by the surviving spouse of the deceased, or if there be no surviving spouse,
by the children personally, or, if minors, by their guardian, shall constitute a consent by such execu-
tor, administrator, surviving spouse, or children or guardian, to the testimony of any physician who
attended said deceased."
"'Ibid.
"Calif. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1881(2) (Deering 1953): "An attorney can not, without the
consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice
given thereon in the course of professional employment; nor can an attorney's secretary, stenog-
rapher, or clerk be examined, without the consent of his employer, concerning any fact the knowl-
edge of which has been acquired in such capacity."
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tions between an attorney and the agent of his client are also entitled to the
same protection from disclosure as those passing directly between the attorney
and his client." The Supreme Court expressly reserved ruling on the question
of compelling an expert to testify without consent or compensation.
Twenty years later, in 1951, Dr. Catton again appeared in the reports
in City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court of City and County
of San Francisco.6 A personal injury plaintiff sued the City and County and
the Western Pacific Railroad Company. At the request of plaintiff's attorneys,
Dr. Catton gave the plaintiff a neurological and psychiatric examination.
It appeared from Dr. Catton's deposition that there was no physician-patient
relationship between him and the plaintiff, that he did not advise or treat the
plaintiff, and that the sole purpose of the examination was to aid plaintiff's
attorneys in the preparation of the case and that he was the agent of the
attorneys. Dr. Catton refused to answer questions as to the plaintiff's con-
dition on the grounds, among others, of the physician-patient and the attorney-
client privilege. The City and County sought mandamus in the Supreme Court
to compel the Superior Court to order Dr. Catton to answer the questions.
Mandamus was denied. The Supreme Court disapproved certain grounds
of decision in the earlier Webb' r case relative to the scope of the physician-
patient privilege and the patient-litigant exception.'" However, it went on
to say that though the sought-for testimony was not covered by the physician-
patient privilege, it was covered by the attorney-client privilege, 9 and that
Dr. Catton was an intermediate agent for communication between the plaintiff
and his attorneys. The court discussed the public policy behind the statutes,
the requirement that the communication be intended to be confidential, and
the types of agents that might be involved, such as interpreters, messengers,
etc. Moreover, the Supreme Court held that it did not matter whether it was
the attorney's or the client's agent or both. The attorney's agent is the client's
sub-agent. Any form of agency employed or set in motion by the client is
within the privilege.
This holding naturally gives rise to certain interesting questions. An
attorney often engages or deals with certain other types of agents, such as
investigators, appraisers, etc. Would their opinions be similarly privileged?
For example, an appraiser's report. The appraiser may not be precisely an
intermediate agent for communication between the client and his attorney.
But he is certainly an agent whose services are necessary to make any com-
munication between client and attorney intelligible when the communication
relates to the value of the client's property. In the City and County case, the
court states that if the plaintiff had described his physical condition directly
"e37 Cal.2d 227, 231 P.2d 26, 25 A.L.R.2d 1418 (1951).
" See note 12 supra.
"
8See note 13 supra.
1See note 15 supra.
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to his attorney that, certainly, is privileged even though a client is not listed
in Code of Civil Procedure section 1881(2),2 which lists only a secretary,
stenographer, or clerk. Might it not be similarly said that since, if a client
tells his attorney the value of the client's property, that is privileged, when
he does so through the medium of an appraiser whom he has hired to value
it, the latter communication should be equally privileged? To describe the
condition of his body to the attorney the client needs the services of a physi-
cian. By a parity of reasoning, to tell the attorney the value of his property
the client needs the services of an appraiser. Should not the appraiser's report
and the physician's report both be privileged?
Certainly the same reasons of policy which the Supreme Court considered
in this case would equally govern, namely, that the absence of the privilege
would convert the attorney habitually and inevitably into a mere informer
for the benefit of the opponent.
To end any possible uncertainty in regard to the various types of agent
and the various types of report that an attorney might require in the service
of his client, Assembly Bill 572 was introduced as part of the 1953 State Bar
Program."' The introduction in the Assembly was by Mr. Fleury. The bill
reads in part as follows:
"An act to amend Section 1881 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relating
to confidential communications.
"The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
"SECTION 1. Section 1881 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended
to read:
"1881. There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the
law to encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate; therefore, a person
can not be examined as a witness in the following cases:
*t *
"2. An attorney can not, without the consent of his client, be examined
as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the'course of professional employment; nor can an attorney's
secretary, stenographer, [or] clerk or any other person employed or engaged
by such attorney in connection with the client's business be examined, without
the consent of [his employer] the client, concerning any fact the knowledge
of which has been acquired in such [capacity] employment or engagement,
and if any person, othef than the opposing party or his counsel or representa-
tive is present, at the request of either the attorney or his client, at a confer.
ence between the attorney and his client, neither such person nor the attorney
or client can be examined without the consent of the client as to any statement
or communication m6,de in such conference by any of the parties thereto or
as to any advice given by the attorney to the client; nor can an attorney's
working papers, including, but without limitation, witness statements, investi-
"XIbi S-
'XVII State Bar Journal (May-June, 1952) 190 et seq.
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gator's reports, appraiser's reports, medical, scientific, economic or other
reports, made for the attorney in preparation of or in connection with a trial,
be examined without the consent o1 the client.
* * *7222
The bill failed of passage2" but, in redrafted form, will undoubtedly
appear later before the Legislature.24
"Italics and lined-out words appear in the proposed bill. Matter in brackets denotes strike out.
"The writer obtained the following information from the Office of the Legislative Counsel:
"The Final Calendar of Legislative Business for the Regular Session 1953 shows only
the following entries concerning this bill:
Jan. 12-Read first time. To print.
Jan. 15-From printer. To committee.
June 10-From committee without further action."
June 10 was the day of final adjournment. The Committee referred to is the Assembly Judiciary
Committee, Assemblyman Caldecott, Chairman.
"See comment on this in XXVIII State Bar Journal (July-August, 1953) 265.
